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NEW SEA BOUNDARIES IN A SWEDISH
PERSPECTIVE
Hugo Tiberg*
Sweden's experiences in applying the principles of the new international law of sea boundaries have more than local interest. Zonebound
on all sides and thus never able to determine unilaterally the limits of
her newly declared zones, the country has been forced to maneuver in
a tight geographical and political situation against smaller brothers on
three sides and a dominant eastern neighbor. It has been a tricky
game in the borderland between legal principles and pragmatism,
where trump cards have been islands of "sufficient" size, and where
points have been scored through moderation rather than by overstraining the rules of the game. The rules themselves have shown
themselves ambiguous and contentious, but the parties have preferred
a non-binding discussion of their contents to the hazard of restoring to
a referee.
The game has had to be played with much give and take, but in
retrospect it may perhaps be said that Sweden has come out on a par,
or even slightly ahead.
THE ZONES

The momentous changes that have occurred in the international
law of sea boundaries need not be documented in a volume dedicated
to the memory of Professor William W. Bishop. Readers in the area
in which he achieved eminence may be assumed to be aware of the
traditional Grotius-inspired principle of the freedom of the high seas
beyond narrow territorial waters, and of the late infringement of this
freedom through various extensions of the coastal jurisdiction. They
will know of straight baselines drawn across open water on the
strength of a famous fishing case through which real adjacency to land
ceased to be a workable test. They will be familiar with the 1959 Con,tinental Shelf convention and will remember how it was extended by
the ever growing appetite of many coastal states for bigger morsels of
the surrounding seas - a development first denounced by major powers as exorbitant but gradually accepted by consensus in the course of
* Professor of Law and Dean of Foreign Students, University of Stockholm. M.C.L. 1959,
University of Michigan.
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a series of conferences leading to the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS").'
But if the general development of the law of the sea may be taken
for granted in this paper, the special application of the rules by Sweden is not generally known and necessitates a presentation. 2 Moreover, the acceptance on all sides concerned of a convention not yet in
force3 is worthy of attention. Throughout, claims and negotiations
have been based on UNCLOS as expressing the present state of international law of sea boundaries, in preference, indeed, to the formally
applicable 1958 Shelf Convention. 4 Although Sweden had not fully
exploited the possibilities of the new convention, and though in at least
one respect she has resorted to the old convention to expound the
meaning of the new one, she, too, has fully accepted the UNCLOS
framework for the negotiations.
Around most of her coasts, Sweden is surrounded by an archipelago of quite a considerable extension. The land surface in these parts
is mostly granite, with islands gradually dwindling into small rocks
jutting out of the water and shoals which are from time to time submerged. There is no appreciable tide, and water level changes due to
winds and currents will not normally exceed a metre.
5
According to the principle of the Anglo-Norwegian FisheriesCase,
Sweden has drawn baselines for its boundaries along the outermost
islands and rocks not always submerged by water. Inside these baselines are the internal waters, which are subject in principle to complete
Swedish sovereignty; outside lies the territorial sea, still Swedish territory though by international law open to innocent passage by ships of
all nations. In her internal waters, Sweden has availed herself of her
sovereign rights to declare large parts of her archipelagos to be military restriction areas 6 in which passage of foreigners and foreign ships
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/
122, reprinted in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 B28 (K. Simmonds, ed.
1983).
2. An informative discussion of the occurrences is found in B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG,
FOLKRATr OCH SAKERHETSPOLITIK (Stockholm 1986), a series of lectures and presentations,
partly in English. The author was the Swedish foreign office's expert at the time discussed in this
paper.
3. UNCLOS requires sixty ratifications and will come into force twelve months after the last
of these. To date (March 1989) only 38 ratifications have been handed in, though more than 150
countries have signed the treaty.
4. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
5. 1951 I.C.J. 132.
6. Presently Ordinance 1976:935 on Restricted and Semi-restricted Areas, to be replaced by a
new Law on Military Restriction Areas. SWEDEN'S OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS 1986:7 [hereinafter SOU].
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is prohibited, but the recognition of innocent passage is demonstrated
by the fact that these areas are never allowed to extend into the territorial sea.
Traditionally Sweden, in common with her neighbors Norway and
Finland, has claimed a four mile breadth 7 of her territorial sea off the
baselines, though the claim could not always be upheld during the two
world wars, when a practical limit of three miles was maintained. In
1979, the breadth was extended to twelve miles, equal to the maximum
already agreed by the UNCLOS delegates and adopted by an increasing number of states, among them the Soviet Union, who has an ancient history of expansive coastal water policy. 8 Norway and Finland
retain their traditional four mile limits, while Denmark has three
miles.
Outside her territorial waters, Sweden does not maintain a contiguous zone for customs, immigration, and sanitary purposes, as allowed
by UNCLOS Article 33. Nor does she claim an Exclusive Economic
Zone ("EEZ") for all purposes, being content with a fishing zone and
her part of the continental shelf; with insignificant exceptions the two
are identical in extent and are so treated in negotiations with the
neighbors. 9 The zones, as I have indicated, are on all sides cut off by
the waters and zones of neighboring countries and do not anywhere
even approach the full extent allowed by the respective conventions.
The exact drawing of the respective boundaries is rather complicated and depends to a large extent on what agreements Sweden has
been able to reach with her neighbors.
BASELINES

The principles for drawing baselines are generally the same in UNCLOS as in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea,' 0 although
with the wide territorial limits under the newer convention the recognition of salient base points have much more important consequences.
Straight baselines may not be drawn to outlying islands quite separate from the coast or coastal archipelago, or out of the general direc7. Nautical miles, equal to 1852 meters or approximately 1.2 statute miles, herein referred to
as miles.
8. See generally W. BUTLER, THE LAW OF SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS (1967). It appears that twelve mile fishing zones were claimed already in imperial Russia before the revolution
and met with much resistance from the other powers.
9. Cf infra text accompanying note 50, on the few discrepancies between the zone and the
Swedish shelf are, and on the bearing of this issue upon the coming final deliberations about the
Swedish-Finnish zones.
10. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 512 U.N.T.S. 205, Art. 4.
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tion of the coast.11 Such islands or groups of islands form their own
baselines and have their own territorial waters. Thus, the island of
Gotland off the Swedish coast has its own territorial water, and the
Gotska Sandbn and Karlsd islands, which are solitary in the sea or
outside the general run of the Gotland coast, have their own baselines
with resulting bulges on the territorial boundary.
"Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic
life of their own" are not regarded under UNCLOS for the purposes of
establishing economic zones or founding claims to the continental
shelf. 12 Accordingly, Sweden disregards baselines drawn to such
points for the purpose of delimiting zones and shelves. 13 While for the
territorial sea there have been no reported discussions about such baselines, there have been lengthy disputes with neighboring countries as
to how the baselines should affect the continental shelf and fishing
zone. I shall return to these problems in my account of the delimitation of these areas. 14
TERRITORIAL SEA

With the old four mile limit there were few areas in which Sweden
could not unilaterally determine her territorial waters without need to
discuss the matter with her neighbors. There was indeed a dispute
with Norway on the boundary around some fishing skerries on the
West Coast, resolved through arbitration in 1909,15 and there have
been discussions with Denmark concerning the demarcation line
through the Sound, 16 and with Finland about the Sea of Aland 7 and
the common coastline off the northern tip of the Gulf of Bothnia, 18 but
these were not of much consequence and concerned small areas.
Otherwise the boundary was drawn parallel to the baselines and four
miles outside these.
11. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
12. Id. art. 121 (3).
13. Thus, Sweden emphatically protested against the Danish baseline to Hessel6, c. infra
text accompanying notes 37-47, though in the end Denmark was allowed limited credit for this
line. The larger Gotska Sand6n north of Gotland has been allowed her own shelf and fishing
zone on a par with Gotland.
14. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
15. The "pig shoals" (Grisbadar) conflict. See Sihl, in 1930:6 SOU 269-70, supra note 6.
16. Agreement of January 30, 1932, SWEDEN'S AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN POWERS
1932:1 [hereinafter SO].
17. Swedish-Finnish treaty of September 29, 1972, 1973:1 S6, supra note 16, on the basis of
the Swedish-Russian peace treaty of Fredrikshamn, 1809, and on the Convention 1921 on the
non-militarisation of the Aland islands. See also B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, at
193-206 and accompanying notes.
18. Swedish-Finnish treaty of September 29, 1972, supra note 17, reserving certain agreements in the peace treaty of Fredrikshamn 1811.
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After extending her territorial sea to twelve miles, Sweden has
longer borders shared with neighbors and has in some cases had to
compromise in order to accommodate a mutual interest.
In general, the UNCLOS principle of delimiting opposite or adjacent coasts is along the median line, irrespective of the breadth of territorial waters claimed by the two countries concerned. Thus, the fact
that Denmark maintains only a three mile territorial sea gives no
claim to Sweden, with twelve miles' extension, to any waters beyond
the median line.
However, in the approaches to the Danish Sound and in the straits
of Bornholm in the Baltic and those of Anholt and Laes6 in the Kattegatt (see Figure 1), a maximum claim to the median line could have
unfavorable consequences. Under UNCLOS, international straits consisting wholly of territorial waters' 9 are governed by the new regime of
transit passage, which involves more extensive shipping rights than the
innocent passage otherwise allowed through a coast state's territorial
waters, and which, among other things, would not allow Sweden to
require diplomatic prenotification of warships passing into such territorial waters. 20 This new regime does not apply to the Sound, where
passage is governed by a separate earlier agreement, 2' but it would
apply to its approaches and the other passages mentioned, unless there
were an "international" route through these not touching the territorial sea of either state. 22 As long as Denmark maintains a three-mile
limit and the Swedish claim stops at midwater, such a free passage
may be said to exist on the Danish side; but it would be improper and
unwise to rely on the continuance of this unilateral restraint. It has
therefore been made clear to Denmark that in these areas neither
country will claim sovereignty to the median line, but that there will
23
be left a corridor of non-territorial water for international shipping.
A corresponding arrangement has not been considered necessary in
the straits of Aland and the Gulf of Bothnia (Norra Kvarken), where
24
prenotification is required of all foreign warships.
19. See the exception in UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 36.
20. On transit passage, compare UNCLOS, id., arts. 37-44 with arts. 17-32 on innocent passage through the territorial sea. Prenotification from warships is not mentioned there and is
somewhat contentions, but it is required by Sweden for passage through territorial waters except
in the sound. See B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, at 121-23.
21. The so-called abolition agreement of 1857, through which Denmark agreed with Sweden
and a number of other States to abolish tolls and allow free passage through the Danish straits.
See D. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, at 174-77, 230-31.

22. UNCLOS, supra note I, at art. 36.
23. The agreement takes the form of a Swedish declaration of June 25, 1978, 1979:43 SO,
supra note 17.
24. According to B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, this has not raised any protests

Spring 1989]

New Sea Boundaries in a Swedish Perspective

SWEDEN

%"Bornh

Figure 1

Fishing and Shelf Limits Against Denmark

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 10:686

FISHING ZONE AND CONTINENTAL SHELF

Apart from a minor deviation in the kland sea, 25 the fishing zone
and the Swedish continental shelf are identical in extent, and are so
treated in the discussions with other countries. The demarcation lines
in all places are shared with Sweden's neighbors and are therefore
everywhere the result of discussions with them.2 6 A final settlement of
these lines in relation to Finland and Poland has long been deferred
pending discussions with the Soviet Union on the boundary east of
Gotland between the Swedish shelf and fishing zone and the Soviet
economic zone; yet after the recent agreement on this latter boundary,
the road now seems open to a final settlement of the other disputes.
Briefly, the situation with regard to Gotland was the following.
Gotland is an island of 3,140 square kilometers and a length including
the island of Far6 in the north, of about 125 kilometers (see Figure 2).
With a population of some 56,000, it is a separate county of Sweden.
In discussions with the Soviet Union - which, like Sweden, has
signed but not ratified the UNCLOS - Sweden has consistently maintained that Gotland should be regarded as an integral part of Sweden,
since under UNCLOS article 121 it cannot be disregarded for zone or
shelf purposes as a "rock which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of its own." Sweden has therefore argued that the demarcation line should be the median between the Gotland and Soviet
baseline 27 in accordance with both the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention28 and the settled practice of nations. The Soviets, on the other
hand, would disregard Gotland for zone purposes, and advocated that
the disputed area be treated by both sides as a "white zone" in which
ships from all nations would be allowed to fish. 29 Speculations that
there might be oil in the area 30 heightened interest in the discussions,
but both sides have refrained from drilling. 31 Sweden wanted to bring
by foreign powers. That article in the book was originally written in 1973, however, and it would
seem that the straits should now be subject to the regime of transit passage. It is notable that
there have been many indications of unnotified foreign submarine activity in the Gulf of Bothnia.
25. See infra text accompanying note 50.
26. Agreements have been concluded with Norway, with Finland (with an exception for the
Bogskir area), 1973:1 SO, supra note 16, with East Germany, 1978:2 id., and with Denmark,
1985:54 id.
27. See the State practice cited by B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, at 269-70.
28. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 4, at article 6(1) for opposite states,
and at article 6(2) for adjacent states.
29. Roth, Den nya haysratten, 1984:2 UD INFORMERAR 1, 20, 24.
30. This has been claimed by the oil prospecting company Petroscan since 1983. Ny Teknik,
TEKNISK TIDSKRIFr, 1988:31, at 14-15.
31. In accordance with a Soviet-Sweden Protocol of December 22, 1977 (annexed to the
Fishing Agreement).
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the dispute before the International Court of Justice, but the Soviet
32
Union refused.
The trouble with the Swedish standpoint was that, although UN33
CLOS specifies the median line for delimiting the territorial sea, it
has no corresponding provision about fishing or economic zones; furthermore, regarding the continental shelf, it states only that the delimitation should be effected by agreement on the basis of international
law. 34 A provision in the 1958 Convention prescribing the median line
in the absence of other agreement 35 has not been reiterated in UNCLOS. On the other hand, the Soviet position had no support either
in reason or in the old or new conventions, and it was directly con36
trary to that maintained by the Soviet Union in other areas.
The Swedish position was, however, also complicated by a simultaneous dispute with Denmark. When, in 1977, the Swedish Riksdag
decided to extend its maritime zones in accordance with the new consensus reached in the current UNCLOS negotiations, the implementation of the new fishing zone met with resistance from Denmark. The
disagreement concerned both the drawing of certain baselines and the
weight attributed to the separate Danish islands Anholt, Laes6 and
Hessel6 in Kattegatt, and Bornholm and Christiansb with the "Pea
Islets" in the Baltic. Pending discussions, fishing rights remained
what they had been under various fishing agreements.
Denmark had also drawn a baseline to Hessel6, against which Sweden protested. Hessel6 is an islet or gravel elevation of 0,7 square
kilometers in the Kattegatt (see Figure 1) with only two human inhabitants who might possibly spend the year there. Was this a "rock
which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of its
own" in the UNCLOS sense? The discussions had stalemated when in
1983 the Danish foreign office gave the A.P M611er Co. a concession to
drill for oil inside the white zone. 37 In spite of an immediate Swedish
demand for a postponement, drillings began in August, and were fol38
lowed three days later by an official Swedish protest.
32. B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, at 261-62.

33. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 15.
34. Id. at art. 83.

35. See the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 6(1) and 6(2).
36. As examples, B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra note 2, at 271, mentions the delimita-

tions between the Soviet Union and Finland as agreed on May 5, 1967, and also that between
Soviet and Rumania over the island of Ostrov Zmeinya. The Soviet position in the Baltic is also
said to have been inconsistent with that taken by the Soviet Union in the Bering Sea.
37. Svensk-dansk grdnstvist efter oljefynd, Svenska Dagbladet, July 20, 1983; and the synposis
in Tyst i narafem dr, Dagens Nyheter, Aug. 19, 1983. The drilling platform was in position on
August 1, 1983.
38. Official protest, August 4, 1983.
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At this time, the affair was widely publicized, and both the Danish
and Swedish press had sensed a discrepancy in the Swedish position
vis-a-vis Denmark in the Kattegatt compared to that taken against Soviet in the Baltic. 39 The distinction between a large island with a considerable population and an isolated gravel reef with no permanent
dwellings, though stressed officially, 4° was not always perceived by the
press. 41 A high hand against Denmark could create a very unwelcome
precedent for the simultaneous negotiations with the Soviet Union,
and it was important for the Swedish negotiators to find a quick and
tidy solution.
Within a few days, the Swedish and Danish prime ministers had
agreed to initiate discussions, and towards the end of the month a
Danish delegation was in Stockholm for negotiations. 4 2 The final proposal was made two months later,4 3 and the formal agreement was
signed in the autumn of 198444 and ratified a few months thereafter. 4 5
It gave Denmark full credit for the islands concerned in the muchpublicized affair of the Kattegatt, 46 but gave Sweden some compensation in the Baltic, the demarcation line there being drawn quite close
to the Pea Islets. Thus the Swedish negotiation position could be upheld against the Soviet Union, without the handicap of a widely publi47
cized big brother attitude against Denmark.
On January 13, 1988, the Soviet negotiations were finally brought
to an end by a compromise which can probably be described as moderately successful for Sweden. 48 Sweden received 75% of the disputed
area and the Soviet Union the remaining 25%, 49 and the parties mutu39. Melander, Inget brott mot folkr'tten, Dagens Nyheter, Aug. 12, 1983. Melander advocated the application of the 1958 convention, but was contradicted by Danelius on the following
day, Dagens Nyheter, Aug. 13, 1983.

40. Interview with Bo Johnson-Teutenberg, as expert of the foreign office, in Folkra'tsliga
principeravgor, Svenska Dagbladet, August 6, 1983; and Theutenberg, Vi har viktiga principeratt
forsvara, Svenska Dagbladet, August 19, 1983; reprinted in B. JOHNSON-TEUTENBERG, supra
note 2, at 244.
41. Danmark har rdtt, Dagens Nyheter, July 23, 1983; but see Svensk-dansk granstvist efter

oljefund, Svenska Dagbladet, July 20, 1983.
42. Uppgorelse n'rmar sig, Svenska Dagbladet, Aug. 24, 1983; Tvisten mot en ldsning, Svenska Dagbladet, Sept. 1, 1983.
43. Slutbud om gransen mot Danmark, Svenska Dagbladet, October 23, 1983.

44. Avtalet klart om fiskezon, Svenska Dagbladet, Nov. 10, 1984.
45. 1985:54 S6, supra note 16; and Prop. 1984/85:131.
46. Only half credit was given for the baselines to Hesselo, however.
47. Cf Nu loper svenskerna helt amok, Dagens Nyheter, Aug. 21 1986, reflecting a Danish
attitude.
48. See Prop 1987/88:175, in particular the satisfaction expressed on page 7.
49. The technical division was elaborated in a separate agreement of January 18, printed in
Prop. 1987/88:175, annex 2.
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ally granted one another certain fishing rights in the relinquished
areas.
This solution can be expected to set the pattern for the future negotiations with Poland about the much smaller adjoining area south of
Gotland which has been in dispute between the countries. There will
remain negotiations with Finland concerning the weight to be attributed to the small Bogskir rocks. They sport a lighthouse but are very
insignificant in size50 and completely unfit for human habitation. If
Hessel6 could be a precedent, it would be a very inconclusive one.
However, in these negotiations it may be deemed suitable to clear out
certain discrepancies between fishing zones and the shelf division, so
that a streamlined boundary system can be found, and gives and takes
may be possible in such negotiations.
CONCLUSIONS

The Swedish experience demonstrates the sensitive balance between legality and pragmatism in the important negotiations required
for implementation of the new law of the sea. Some of Sweden's maneuvers against her equal or smaller brother countries have been made
in seeming disregard of the legal possibilities, and were dictated by a
desire to obtain a successful bargaining position against her bigger and
less tractable neighbor Soviet Russia. It might have been possible to
forbear that sacrifice - if sacrifice it was - by submitting the greater
dispute to the International Court of Justice, but this road was closed
by the Soviet attitude. Even so, it may well have been an advantage to
both parties to have enjoyed the certainty of gradually reaching a conscious solution rather than submitting to the hazard of an unknown
one.
As in most negotiations, the legal solution has still exerted a decisive influence, the negotiations and final outcome being in all cases
within the bounds of what might possibly be the proper legal solution.
Throughout the discussions, the background regulation was that of
UNCLOS, although that convention had not been ratified by any of
the actors. Whether this reverence for a formally non-binding convention is due to the parties being signatories is hard to say, 5 1 but it is
noteworthy that in the end Sweden accepted a solution (departure
50. The aggregate surface is reported to be just over 4,000 square meters.
51. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969
(entered intoforce January 27, 1980), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), and in
63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), art. 18(a), ratified by both Sweden and the Soviet Union, signatories to a convention are obliged to refrain from actions inconsistent with its fundamental
principles.
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from the midwater principle) which she had strenuously opposed during the pre-convention conferences.
The Swedish experience hardly enables us to say to what extent
UNCLOS represents the general international law of today, applicable
to signatories and non-signatories alike. But although the outcome
itself hardly justifies any such conclusions, I can report a clear feeling
among Swedish negotiators that as far as relevant, the rules of the
convention were regarded by all hands as an expression of the world
52
law of the sea, applicable by general consensus.

52. This seems to be only one testimony among many others. For examples of other law of
the sea rules being challenged, see the address by E.L. Miles of the Institute of Marine Studies, in
COUNCIL ON OCEAN LAW 5 (1988).

